In the early hours of August 30, 2024, the 333-metre Singapore-flagged container ship Maersk Shekou was being guided into Fremantle Port’s inner harbour under the direction of two harbour pilots and assisted by four tugs. While the vessel was manoeuvring, it struck the three-masted sail-training ship STS Leeuwin II, which was berthed alongside Victoria Quay. The impact dismasted the Leeuwin II and caused extensive damage to both the vessel and nearby port infrastructure, including the roof of the Western Australian Maritime Museum. Two crew aboard Leeuwin II sustained minor injuries.
Bridge Resource Management Failures
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigation found that a series of bridge resource management (BRM) lapses, communication failures, and operational oversights were behind the collision.
Failure in Command and Communication
- The lead pilot intended to issue a “port 10°” helm order to begin a critical turn into the inner harbour but failed to do so.
- The helmsman, unaware of the missed command, maintained the previous heading of 083°, allowing the vessel to continue straight instead of turning.
- The bridge team lacked a “shared mental model” of the manoeuvre — a collective understanding of the plan, cues, and expected actions. This meant that no one recognized or corrected the missed order in time.
Distraction and Monitoring Breakdowns
- The assisting pilot was on a non-essential mobile phone call during the critical turning phase, failing to monitor helm actions or the lead pilot’s intentions.
- One of the four tugs had not yet been properly secured to the vessel when it approached the turning point, creating additional distraction and increasing pilot workload.
Environmental and Operational Deviations
- The ship entered the narrow channel before sunrise in poor weather, with strong south-westerly winds gusting up to 50 knots — conditions close to or exceeding safe operating limits.
- Standard port risk controls, including full tug readiness and adherence to weather thresholds, were not fully implemented.
Sequence of Events
- Pre-Transit: The Maersk Shekou remained offshore due to earlier weather delays. The pilot boarded shortly before 5 a.m. local time.
- Channel Entry: As the ship entered the inner harbour, gusting winds made manoeuvring difficult.
- Missed Turn: At around 6:10 a.m., the critical port turn was missed. The helmsman kept the ship on course, unaware that the pilot’s turn order had not been given.
- Collision: The ship’s bow flare struck Leeuwin II’s rigging, dismasting the vessel. Moments later, the container ship’s stern swung toward the wharf, colliding with the Maritime Museum’s roof.
- Aftermath: The Maersk Shekou was eventually stabilised by the tugs. The Leeuwin II suffered extensive rigging damage and required months of repairs.
Impact and Consequences
- Leeuwin II’s masts and rigging were destroyed, though the hull remained watertight. The vessel’s youth training programs were suspended indefinitely.
- Two crew members received medical treatment for minor injuries.
- Fremantle Port and the adjacent museum sustained structural damage, adding to repair costs and operational disruptions.
The ATSB report characterised the event as “a preventable allision driven by human performance breakdowns,” highlighting that even experienced pilots can fail under poor coordination and high workload conditions.
Key Lessons for the Maritime Industry
- Shared Mental Models: Every bridge team member — from pilots to helmsmen and tug masters — must have a unified understanding of the passage plan and critical manoeuvres.
- Active Monitoring: All bridge officers must remain vigilant, monitoring course, heading, and rate of turn, ready to challenge any deviation immediately.
- Distraction Control: Mobile phone use or unrelated communication during critical navigation phases must be strictly prohibited.
- Environmental Limits: Weather and visibility thresholds must be treated as binding operational boundaries, not flexible targets.
- Port Oversight: Port authorities must ensure that tugs are secured and ready before high-risk manoeuvres commence, especially under adverse weather.
Safety Actions and Outlook
Both Fremantle Ports and Fremantle Pilots have since implemented revised pilotage procedures, including stricter tug-readiness verification and enhanced BRM refresher training. The ATSB is preparing a final report with further safety recommendations.
For the maritime community, this incident is a sobering reminder that the most advanced ships, navigation aids, and pilotage systems are only as effective as the human teams operating them. When coordination falters — even for seconds — the results can be catastrophic.
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